These banks can then continue to provide credit to sound borrowers in the event of a local recession, rather than cutting lending to all customers. We will not see indispensable ex ante private mechanisms of risk-sharing until ex post public mechanisms are in place. But the lack of ex ante mechanisms puts too much pressure on the functioning of public mechanisms, making their introduction even more difficult and unlikely.
These vicious circles are hindering progress towards completion of the banking union. That is why we cannot stand still. We need to move forward and make the most of the opportunities that are already available in the current European legislative framework. We need to start from somewhere and I would argue that market players can play a fundamental role here. In the remainder of my speech, I will outline the main prudential obstacles to banking sector integration that are still embedded in the European legislative framework.
I would then like to propose some potential ways of making progress within the current legislative and institutional framework, based on our ongoing discussions in ECB Banking Supervision. The obstacles to cross-border integration embedded in the European regulatory framework There are already several excellent analyses of the many shortcomings of the European regulatory framework[ 6 ], so today I will focus on the main obstacles to cross-border integration at the legislative level.
The Basel international standards have traditionally been based on the consolidated regulation and supervision of internationally active banks. In general, locally incorporated subsidiaries of international banks are requested to fully comply with the local minimum regulatory requirements at individual entity level. For branches, national authorities often rely on the prudential requirements set by the home authorities. When the internationally agreed standards were transposed into the European legal framework, prudential requirements in Europe were principally applied at the individual entity level, as well as at the consolidated level.
By default, each and every legal entity providing banking products and services needs to fulfil prudential requirements at the solo level. Intragroup waivers play a key role here. EU banking legislation gives supervisors the option of waiving certain prudential requirements at the level of individual banks and allowing banking groups to meet those requirements on a group-wide or sub-group basis only.
Such waivers would in theory make it more attractive for banking groups to reach across borders, as they would make it possible to transfer capital and liquidity resources between legal entities in the same banking group. But for solo capital, large exposure and leverage requirements, those waivers can only be granted for subsidiaries in the same Member State, and not in a cross-border context, even within the banking union. A similar approach was adopted for the waivers for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities under the revised Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, the BRRD2.
The situation is better for liquidity requirements: the legislative framework does allow cross-border waivers of individual liquidity requirements, creating cross-border liquidity sub-groups. But some Member States, exercising an option that will remain in the legislation until , have imposed limits on intragroup exemptions from the large exposure requirements which, as we have seen, cannot be waived, cross-border, at the solo level. Chart 3 Excess liquidity held in the euro area by non-domestic subsidiaries of SSM significant institutions To complete the picture, we also need to consider macroprudential requirements, for which the European legislative framework contains all the hallmarks of minimum harmonisation.
In fact, most of the macroprudential requirements are enshrined in the Capital Requirements Directive, while the most relevant macroprudential provisions in the Capital Requirements Regulation relate to options for Member States. At ECB Banking Supervision, we saw this issue in sharp relief when, during the pandemic, we implemented our recommendation on dividend distribution restrictions.
Transferring resources from one group entity to another was not — and, I would say, could not be — in our supervisory scope, especially within European banking supervision. But several Member States stopped subsidiaries within cross-border banking groups from paying dividends to their parent entity in line with macroprudential national measures that had been taken to make the national financial system more resilient.
In some cases, this led to situations where the restrictions were applied to subsidiaries of foreign banks which already had solvency buffers far higher than the regulatory requirements and any reasonable solvency projections. Also as a result of the application of those national measures on dividend distribution restrictions, the amount of capital held in national jurisdictions increased even further above the prudential requirements applicable to individual subsidiaries see Chart 4.
Chart 4 CET1 ratios of parent entities and cross-border subsidiaries The legal framework for macroprudential tools introduced after the great financial crisis entrusted national designated authorities with flexibility so they could cater to local financial and economic conditions and adjust their policies in the light of experience.
Within the euro area, a safety valve was left for the ECB to intervene and top-up national measures. But the ECB can only intervene in the case of EU harmonised measures, and many national macroprudential powers are delinked from EU legislation. I would argue that, with the experience gained with macroprudential policies over the last decade, it is now time to move to a more harmonised European framework, with a stronger coordination role at the European level. This should enable the side effects of decentralised macroprudential policies to be mitigated, preventing further regulatory fragmentation along national lines.
But until now there have not been specific proposals for major reforms of the macroprudential framework. On a more optimistic note, let me end this quick survey of applicable prudential requirements with a positive development related to designated or competent authorities being able to consider the euro area as a single jurisdiction within the global systemically important institutions G-SIIs methodology[ 10 ].
In short, there are numerous legal prudential obstacles to the free circulation of capital and liquidity within banking groups in the euro area. While legislative reforms aimed at removing these obstacles are clearly possible, we are unlikely to see them finalised in the near future, and surely not before a fully fledged EDIS is put in place. If we want to achieve progress now, we need to pursue other avenues, which also require commitment and creative solutions from the banking industry.
Avenues to accelerate progress in the integration of the euro area banking sector One possible avenue is to continue relying on groups that focus mainly on subsidiaries to expand their business across the banking union. A contractual approach could be developed through intragroup guarantees, which could be made enforceable, and therefore credible, using supervisory tools at the European level. This is the proposal I developed in a blog post written with my colleague on the Supervisory Board, Edouard Fernandez-Bollo.
This could facilitate the granting of cross-border liquidity waivers at the solo level to the extent possible within the current legislative framework. Admittedly, this approach would not be an immediate game changer, as the benefits would be constrained by the limits set in the regulatory framework, but it could enable some additional pooling of liquid assets at the group level.
And, most importantly, a positive experience with intragroup agreements would foster a more positive attitude at national authorities, creating the conditions for legislative change to happen sooner. Another avenue that is more radical and challenging, but potentially more promising, would be for banks to review their cross-border organisational structure more actively, while keeping in mind the aim of banking sector integration.
I am referring in particular to the possibility of relying more extensively on branches and the free provision of services, rather than subsidiaries, to develop cross-border business within the banking union and the Single Market. I must stress that ECB Banking Supervision does not favour a specific organisational structure for cross-border banking groups under its direct supervision.
These groups are completely free to choose the organisational structure that best suits their business needs, be it through branches or separate legal entities. In fact, I believe that, on a practical level, acquiring a local entity that becomes a subsidiary of the larger banking group may make it much easier to initially enter a new market. It is clearly a matter of using the local expertise and knowledge of the market, not to mention the issue of brand recognition among local customers, especially for retail business.
This notwithstanding, I am puzzled as to why banks have made little use of the basic freedoms of establishment and remote provision of services that were made available with the creation of the Internal Market back in , when the Second Banking Coordination Directive[ 12 ] was transposed into national law across the then 15 Member States. It is difficult to overstate the importance of those documents and decisions, including the very first Treaty amendment, for the history of European integration.
But the seeds of those milestones had been sown a few years earlier by a seminal judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon case of But I can see a parallel between the situation back in and the situation the banking sector is in today. Back then, a fundamental judicial development helped usher in the most dramatic acceleration in the establishment of the Internal Market.
And today, I would suggest that a market-based approach to banking sector integration would equally put pressure on political decision-makers, hopefully ushering in the completion of the banking union. As I said, European banks have made little use of the freedoms that have been available to them since Branches have seldom been used to enter another country within the Internal Market, and existing subsidiaries have generally not been transformed into branches.
Rather, banks have preferred to acquire local credit institutions and integrate them into a cross-border banking group. But the legal prudential framework still does not facilitate the integration of a credit institution established as a separate legal entity in another Member State. Even the establishment of European banking supervision has not yet changed this.
In terms of assets, cross-border branches within the euro area still only represent a minority of intra-EU claims see Chart 1. All this being said, in the last few years there have been some signs of change, with a few cases of corporate integration within cross-border banking groups. The basic assumption is that banks made these choices to become more efficient. We merely granted the supervisory permissions necessary to complete the reorganisation, and there was little change in our ongoing supervision — the composition of our Joint Supervisory Teams did not change and national competent authorities continued to be represented.
The first case I would like to mention is the cross-border reorganisation of Nordea. It converted into a credit institution incorporated in Finland after transforming various separate legal entities in different European Economic Area countries Norway, Finland and Denmark into branches of a Swedish credit institution, which eventually became a branch of the new Finnish entity.
This was a complex process that, from a legal perspective, exploited the opportunities for corporate reorganisations and mobility enshrined in the Cross-border Merger Directive[ 17 ], coupled with the freedom of establishment under the European Treaty. A second related case concerns a Baltic cross-border group, Luminor, which was operating through a holding company and three separate banking subsidiaries in the three Baltic countries. Again, using the opportunities provided by the Cross-border Merger Directive, the two legal entities in Lithuania and Latvia were merged into the Estonian credit institution and are now operating as its branches.
And more broadly in the context of Brexit, there are numerous cases concerning third country groups, in particular Swiss and US groups, which are relocating various activities to the euro area. UBS is a good example, but many US investment banks have also taken the same approach of using the legal tool of the European Company, or Societas Europaea[ 18 ], to transform several legal entities in various Member States into branches of a credit institution incorporated in a single Member State e.
Despite the complexities of such large reorganisations, all the credit institutions contacted reported significant efficiency gains in terms of simplified legal structures and corporate governance, savings related to annual accounts and internal audit and lower overall regulatory requirements, among many others. Certainly, all the legislative prudential obstacles I have mentioned would disappear if, instead of there being separate legal entities in different Member States, capital and liquidity could flow freely within the cross-border group since a branch is structurally part of a single corporate entity.
I am not trying to paint an overly rosy picture by suggesting that those reorganisations did not entail significant costs and execution risks, for example related to IT integration. But our discussions with senior executives of the banking groups involved suggest that these costs and risks are worth it. Savings The level of savings in the economy contributes directly to deposits in the banking system and hence to the supply of loanable funds to BFIs.
An estimate by the International Labor Organization predicts that around 1. Government spending The government expenditure plan has the potential to increase liquidity in the market as government spending is channelized through BFIs via deposits, thereby contributing to the supply of funds to BFIs but it can only happen if the plan is realized in reality.
Additionally, in FY , the government has managed to spend Remittance Remittance has a positive impact on the domestic liquidity position as they are directly deposited in the domestic banking system, thereby increasing the ability of banks to mobilize funds in the economy.
Though the flow of remittances decreased by 1. Furthermore, almost half of the remittances sent to Nepal are through informal channels. A major portion of remittances are not channelized through the banking sector combined with decreasing official inflow has contributed to a reduced ability of BFIs to mobilize funds in the economy which has led to a liquidity crunch.
However, in the same period, the foreign exchange reserve decreased by An increasing BOP deficit implies leakage of domestic funds to the foreign economy, as payments made to businesses abroad for imports are not offset by earnings made through exports. Therefore, increasing trade deficit that drains out the liquidity from the economy, leading to a shortage in liquidity. Despite the injection of large amounts of money to stabilize pressure on liquidity, the problem persists.
However, the central bank is limited in its ability to inject liquidity as demanded due to increasing inflation and trade deficit. The central bank is responsible for maintaining price and external sector stability in the economy. According to NRB statistics , inflation increased to 7.
To limit the adverse impacts of increasing inflation and trade deficit, Nepal Rastra Bank has limitations on injecting liquidity to fulfill the increasing demand for liquidity in the economy.
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